عقلانیت در توازن؛ بازاندیشی نظریه الکسی

Robert Alexy’s theory of balancing is one of the most prominent attempts to provide a rational model for resolving conflicts between legal principles. Yet it has consistently faced criticisms concerning indeterminacy, lack of objectivity, and unpredictability. Drawing on the methods of theoretical–conceptual analysis and a case-based examination of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, this study seeks to demonstrate that a rational reconstruction of this theory is, in fact, possible. Within this framework, theoretical analysis is employed to reinterpret the three mechanisms of balancing—the balancing rule, the assessment formula, and the responsibility of justification—while judicial case studies serve as a “practical test” to illustrate how these mechanisms operate in practice.
The findings of the study show that balancing is not a formal algorithm but a rational process guided by specific constraints. These constraints can be articulated through a clear distinction between normative variables (such as the intensity of the restriction of a right) and empirical variables (such as the extent to which a public interest is realized), as well as by explaining how these variables are integrated within the assessment formula. This distinction and precise formulation enhance the transparency of determining the weight of principles and strengthen the intersubjective evaluability of judicial reasoning—ultimately reducing the scope of discretion and improving the internal coherence of the theory of balancing.