Rule of Law, A.V. Dicey, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Common Law,"

The aim of this research is a critical analysis of the concept of the "Rule of Law" in the thought of Albert Venn Dicey and an assessment of its efficacy in confronting the developments of contemporary legal and political systems. Employing a descriptive-analytical method with a historical-legal approach, this study revisits Dicey's classical texts while critically examining the views of contemporary jurists. The findings reveal that Dicey's classical interpretation faces three fundamental and specific challenges: first, his absolute denial of "administrative law" and the extensive powers of the welfare state, which starkly contradicts the necessities of modern governance and the emergence of regulatory bodies and complex bureaucracies; second, the inherent and unresolved tension between "absolute parliamentary sovereignty" and the "rule of law," demonstrating that Dicey's reliance on Parliament's political self-restraint and common law jurisprudence proves inadequate against the phenomenon of "elective dictatorship" or the enactment of laws contrary to fundamental rights; and third, the contemporary shift in judicial practice from purely formal and literal interpretation of statutes toward "common law constitutionalism," wherein courts, by invoking fundamental democratic principles, impose substantive limits on legislative and executive authority. Ultimately, it is concluded that although the formal components of Dicey's rule of law (equality before the ordinary law and the negation of arbitrariness) remain a necessary bulwark against tyranny, his rigid interpretation is insufficient for today's complex parliamentary systems. Reproducing Dicey's thought in the present era necessitates a transition from the absolute denial of administrative powers toward their "normative conditioning," and the establishment of a dynamic balance between parliamentary sovereignty and substantive judicial review to safeguard civic rights.